Skills/PyPI/mcpbytes-image-to-3d

mcpbytes-image-to-3d@0.1.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Turn one image into a textured 3D model (GLB) with Tencent's Hunyuan3D 2.1, on your own GPU. CLI and MCP server." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mcpbytes · joined 0 days agoInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-26 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hidden zero-width characters detected; OS command execution function call detected; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.2sprocessexec .venv/bin/mcpbytes-image-to-3d
0.2sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/mcpbytes-image-to-3d': No such file or directory
0.2sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/mcpbytes_image_to_3d/vendor/hunyuan3d/hy3dpaint/hunyuanpaintpbr/unet/modules.py:679 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedsrc/mcpbytes_image_to_3d/vendor/hunyuan3d/hy3dshape/hy3dshape/postprocessors.py:194 · OS command execution function call detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/mcpbytes_image_to_3d/extensions.py:39 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/mcpbytes_image_to_3d/server.py:30 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mcpbytes: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  4. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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