mcpbundles@1.5.109
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCPBundles CLI — connect AI to all your MCP tools from the command line" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MCPBUNDLES_API_KEYor--oauthConfiguration, not credentials: DISPLAY, ENVIRONMENT, MCP_TOOL_CALL_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, MCPBUNDLES_API_BASE_URL, MCPBUNDLES_BASE_URL, MCPBUNDLES_CONFIG_DIR, MCPBUNDLES_CONNECTION, MCPBUNDLES_DESKTOP_SHELL_VERSION, MCPBUNDLES_NO_DAEMON, MCPBUNDLES_NO_UPDATE_NOTICE, MCPBUNDLES_OUTPUT, MCPBUNDLES_RUNTIME_OWNER, SystemRoot, UKPI_BROWSER_WORKER- Where it talks to
- mcpbundles.com (its own)Also no-color.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names no-color.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCPBUNDLES_API_KEY only into requests to mcpbundles.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.``ENVIRONMENT=development`` (common when sourcing repo ``.env`` for backendFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.auto_update_enabled: bool = TrueFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.auto_update_enabled=auto_update_enabled,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.auto_update_enabled: bool = True,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.auto_update_enabled=bool(value.get("auto_update_enabled", True)),Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.mcpbundles call connect_mcp_server -- base_url="https://api.example.com/v1" api_key="sk-xxx" name="Example"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.output = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.auto_update_enabled=True,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."auto_update_enabled": True,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."""Test proxy token data follows shared auth resolution for env API keys."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert parse_command("npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem '/Users/tony/My Files'") == [Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.assert '"auto_update_enabled": true' in local_file.read_text()Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.output = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."auto_update_default": True,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.assert loaded["aws-docs"].auto_update_enabled is TrueFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.output = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."567 /bin/zsh -c kill 123 || true && mcpbundles proxy start --as mcpbundles_prod",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.runner.invoke(cli, ["local", "add", "memory", "--command", "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-memory"])Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.output = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."npx server",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.assert "Auto-update is ON" in result.outputFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.runner.invoke(cli, ["local", "add", "memory", "--command", "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-memory"])Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.# Stray CTRL_BREAK from a shared Windows console group must not kill aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcpbundles@1.5.109 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim thinkchainai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
- Credential pass-through configuration≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.