Skills/PyPI/mcparmory-github

mcparmory-github@1.0.6

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Manage repositories, users, releases, and automate GitHub workflows" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher mcparmory · publishing for 235 daysInstalls 888Last detonated 2d ago
$claude mcp add mcparmory-github -- uvx mcparmory-github
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OAUTH2_CALLBACK_PORTOAUTH2_CLIENT_IDOAUTH2_CLIENT_SECRETOAUTH2_SCOPES
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso mcpblacksmith.com, supabase.co, openapis.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names mcpblacksmith.com, supabase.co, openapis.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OAUTH2_CALLBACK_PORT, OAUTH2_CLIENT_ID, OAUTH2_CLIENT_SECRET, OAUTH2_SCOPES only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcparmory-github

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyproject.toml:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env*",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths_auth.py:43 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# OAuth2/OIDC callback server ports (configured in .env)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths_auth.py:132 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Leave empty in .env to disable OAuth2."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Stripe-like API key pattern detected_auth.py:625 · Stripe-like API key pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested keyplaceholders = ["placeholder", "your-", "example", "change-me", "todo", "sk_test_placeholder"]Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths_auth.py:70 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Configured via OAUTH2_CALLBACK_PORT in .env (default: 9400) - Must match redirect URI in your OAuth application configurationFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths_auth.py:621 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Leave empty in .env to disable Bearer Token auth."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 6 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcparmory-github@1.0.6 as of 2d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

mcparmory-github@1.0.6 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills