mcp-yieldshell@1.1.2
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "A drop-in shell MCP that auto-yields long-running commands into managed background executions." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
f"{sys.executable} -c \"import subprocess; subprocess.Popen(['sleep','30'])\"",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."python -c \"import subprocess; subprocess.Popen([\\\"sleep\\\", \\\"30\\\"])\"",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Stop a running execution, escalating to force kill when needed.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Force kill any children that survived graceful termination, even ifFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"subprocess.Popen(['{sys.executable}','-c',"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."(e.g. python -c, node -e, curl ... | sh); create or edit a "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."subprocess.Popen(['sleep','30'])\"",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.``curl ... | sh``. It does not cover simply creating a script orFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = await mgr.execute_command("rm -rf /tmp/test", side_effects=NONE)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."subprocess.Popen(['sleep','30']); time.sleep(30)\"",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.``curl ... | sh``. It does not cover simply creating a script orFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"{sys.executable} -c \"import subprocess; subprocess.Popen(['sleep','30'])\"",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.``curl ... | sh``). It does not cover simply creating a script orFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert config.deny_command_regex.search("rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.["git", "add", "unrelated.txt"], cwd=repo, check=True, capture_output=TrueFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why."(e.g. python -c, node -e, curl ... | sh); create or edit a "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Force kill the process group."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.["git", "add", "unrelated.txt"], cwd=repo, check=True, capture_output=TrueFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.assert config.deny_command_regex.search("rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.``curl ... | sh``). It does not cover simply creating a script orFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Reserve time for force-kill observation, final drain, and subprocessFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert validate_command(config, "rm -rf /") is NoneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.error = validate_command(config, "rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert validate_command(config, "rm -rf /") is NoneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.error = validate_command(config, "rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-yieldshell@1.1.2 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pypi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.