Skills/PyPI/mcp-webs

mcp-webs@1.1.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "MCP Web Search service for AI ecosystem" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 723 daysInstalls 15Last detonated 4d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-webs -- uvx mcp-webs
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
API_KEY_LINEGOOGLE_API_KEYLLM_API_KEYNEW_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ADMIN_KEY_IDS, LLM_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for API_KEY_LINE, GOOGLE_API_KEY, LLM_API_KEY, NEW_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-webs

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker/scripts/setup-env.sh:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesENV_FILE="${PROJECT_ROOT}/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsapp/core/config.py:29 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker/scripts/setup-env.sh:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# If .env already exists, skip generationFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdocker-setup-env: ## Set up .env file for development modeFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsapp/core/config.py:259 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Parse ADMIN_KEY_IDS from comma-separated string in .env into list."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker/docker-compose.yml:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- ../.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker/scripts/setup-env.sh:2 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Auto-generates .env from .env.example on first runFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_config.py:312 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Bypass .env and set required keys via os.environFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdocker-up: ## Start containers (creates .env if missing)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsapp/core/config.py:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesextra="allow", # Allow extra fields from .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker/scripts/setup-env.sh:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesEXAMPLE_ENV_FILE="${PROJECT_ROOT}/.env.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Cipher/encoding referenceSECURITY.md:84 · Cipher/encoding reference — may contain obfuscated instructions- **Cipher:** AES-128-CBCFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_config.py:79 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Use explicit override to bypass .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:29 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files@echo "=== Checking .env file ==="Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_config.py:153 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Bypass .env and set key via os.environFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:30 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files@if [ ! -f ".env" ]; then \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho ".env not found. Creating from .env.example..."; \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_config.py:175 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Bypass .env entirely so os.getenv returns None for LLM_API_KEYFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/unit/test_ssrf.py:58 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetprotection._validate_url("http://172.16.0.1")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/unit/test_ssrf.py:51 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetprotection._validate_url("http://10.0.0.1")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_ssrf.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprotection._validate_url("file:///etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/unit/test_ssrf.py:65 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetprotection._validate_url("http://192.168.1.1")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_ssrf.py:123 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprotection.fetch("file:///etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/unit/test_ssrf.py:72 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameprotection._validate_url("http://8.8.8.8")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/unit/test_llm_failover.py:1155 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetresult = client._resolve_base_url("test-model", "http://192.168.1.1:3000/v1")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/unit/test_ssrf.py:72 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringprotection._validate_url("http://8.8.8.8")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈44 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-webs@1.1.1 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.