mcp-virtual-computer@0.2.11
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "A persistent Docker or Fly computer with a cinematic Three.js MCP App" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
FLY_API_TOKENFLY_TOKENKILNTAINERS_AUTH_TOKENVNC_PATH_TOKENor--fly-token/--auth-token/--allow-unauthenticated-httpConfiguration, not credentials: BACKEND, COMPUTER_ID, FLY_APP_NAME, FLY_ORG, FLY_REGION, FLYCTL_INSTALL, KILNTAINERS_FLY_STATE_FILE, ProgramFiles- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso fly.io, downloads.example, docker.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names fly.io, downloads.example, docker.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects FLY_API_TOKEN, FLY_TOKEN, KILNTAINERS_AUTH_TOKEN, VNC_PATH_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
&& chown computer:computer /home/computer/.config/mimeapps.listFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.&& chmod 0440 /etc/sudoers.d/computer \Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.&& visudo -cf /etc/sudoers.d/computer \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"chown computer:computer {NETWORK_MODE_FILE}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.f"chown computer:computer {NETWORK_MODE_FILE}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"chown computer:computer {NETWORK_MODE_FILE}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.f"chown computer:computer {NETWORK_MODE_FILE}",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.RUN chmod 0755 \Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sudo \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."rm -f /run/mcp-network-disabled; "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.> /etc/sudoers.d/computer \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.f"chown computer:computer {DESKTOP_MODE_FILE}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.rm -f /run/mcp-network-disabledFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."old=$(pgrep -o x11vnc) || exit 1; kill \"$old\"; i=0; "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.&& chmod 0440 /etc/sudoers.d/computer \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.f"chown computer:computer {DESKTOP_MODE_FILE}",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."rm -f /run/mcp-network-disabled; "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run([engine, "info"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"chown computer:computer {NETWORK_MODE_FILE}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chown computer:computer "$desktop_state_file"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod --reference="$p" "$tmp"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.if [ -n "$desktop_pid" ] && kill -0 "$desktop_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if [ -n "$pulse_pid" ] && kill -0 "$pulse_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if [ -n "$x11vnc_pid" ] && kill -0 "$x11vnc_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Mock os.kill to capture callsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Client 1 should see a.txt in its ls outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.if [ -n "$wsproxy_pid" ] && kill -0 "$wsproxy_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if ! kill -0 "$pulse_pid" 2>/dev/null || [ "$count" -gt 100 ]; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.os.kill = original_killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Client 2 should see b.txt in its ls outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.# In HTTP mode, we can't easily kill the sandbox and detect deathFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Actually kill the container externallyFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chown computer:computer "$network_state_file"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.os.kill = mock_kill # type: ignore[assignment]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""Monitor death and kill externally."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.original_kill = os.killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-virtual-computer@0.2.11 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.