mcp-vector-search@4.1.14
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "CLI-first semantic code search with MCP integration and interactive D3.js visualization for exploring code relationships" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_IDAWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEYGITHUB_TOKENHOMEBREW_TAP_TOKENOPENAI_API_KEYOPENROUTER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ANTHROPIC_BEDROCK_BASE_URL, BEDROCK_MODEL, HOMEBREW_TAP_REPO, INDEX_PATH, MCP_CODE_ENRICHMENT, MCP_ENABLE_FILE_WATCHING, MCP_PROJECT_ROOT, MCP_VECTOR_SEARCH_HYBRID_CHUNK_EMBEDDING, PROJECT_ROOT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso astral.sh, endpoint.com, openrouter.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names astral.sh, endpoint.com, openrouter.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN, HOMEBREW_TAP_TOKEN, OPENAI_API_KEY, OPENROUTER_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run( # nosec B607Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.print(" curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run( # nosec B607Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run( # nosec B607Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run( # nosec B607 - git is intentionally called via PATHFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run( # nosec B607Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.("../../../etc/passwd", "Path traversal"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run( # nosec B607Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.("../../../etc/passwd", "Path traversal attempt"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.print(" curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["uv"] + cmd, check=True, cwd=Path(__file__).parent.parent)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.echo "❌ UV package manager not found - install with: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "add", "-A"], check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run( # nosec B607 - git is intentionally called via PATHFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x "${BIN_DIR}/${SCRIPT_NAME}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.echo "❌ UV package manager not found - install with: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Update CLAUDE.md only for minor/major releases or significant patchesFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.echo "5. Update README.md and CLAUDE.md"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."""Update CLAUDE.md Recent Activity section.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.subprocess.run( # nosec B607 - git is intentionally called via PATHFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run( # nosec B607 - git is intentionally called via PATHFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"{YELLOW}[DRY RUN]{RESET} Would update CLAUDE.md Last Updated to {current_date}"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."""Update the 'Last Updated' timestamp in CLAUDE.md.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.print(f"{YELLOW}[DRY RUN]{RESET} Would add to CLAUDE.md Recent Releases:")Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.result = subprocess.run( # nosec B607 - git is intentionally called via PATHFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-vector-search@4.1.14 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim bobmatnyc: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.