mcp-user-confirm@2.0.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Neutral user confirmation MCP for interactive AI coding feedback" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso js.org, rustup.rs — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- nothing has run yet
- What we could not test
- everything: the server has not run yet
Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
console.log('🖱️ 觸發檔案選擇:', fileInput.id);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log('⚙️ FileUploadManager 設定已更新:', {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log('🗑️ PromptInputButtons 已銷毀');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.console.log('✅ FileUploadManager 事件委託設置完成');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.self.app_handle = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.self.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.console.log('🧹 FileUploadManager 資源已清理');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.console.log('📁 FileUploadManager 初始化完成');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log('✅ PromptInputButtons 模組載入完成');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why."del /f",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.console.log('✅ PromptInputButtons 初始化完成,成功綁定', successCount, '組按鈕');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log('🔘 PromptInputButtons 初始化完成');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.result = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.<span data-i18n="images.settings.compatibilityHint">💡 圖片無法正確識別?</span> <button type="button" id="{{ id_prefix }}EnableBase64Hint" class="compatibility-hint-btnFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-user-confirm@2.0.0 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim minidoracat-minidora0702: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.