Skills/PyPI/mcp-uof

mcp-uof@0.5.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server turning UOF workflow operations into AI Agent-callable tools via httpx web automation" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher asgard-ai-platform · publishing for 231 daysInstalls 114Last detonated 4d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-uof -- uvx mcp-uof
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
UOF_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: UOF_ACCOUNT, UOF_BASE_URL, UOF_LOGIN_DEBUG, UOF_LOGIN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, UOF_LOGIN_WAIT_SECONDS, UOF_SESSION_DIR, UOF_SESSION_FILE, UOF_SESSION_NAMESPACE, UOF_SESSION_PERSIST, UOF_SSL_VERIFY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for UOF_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-uof

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_uof/server.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / ".env", override=False)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_uof/server.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv(Path.cwd() / ".env", override=False)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `.env.example` — environment variable template for local setup.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_uof/server.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env from cwd or repo root (don't clobber externally injected env vars).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyproject.toml:49 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"/.env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_uof/auth/browser_login.py:85 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈685 tok
2 files · 54 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-uof@0.5.0 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

mcp-uof@0.5.0 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills