Skills/PyPI/mcp-tts

mcp-tts@0.3.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Text-to-Speech Server for Cursor IDE (and others) with cross-platform audio playback" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher enviraldesign · publishing for 522 daysInstalls 43Last detonated 4d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-tts -- uvx mcp-tts
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ELEVENLABS_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYUV_PUBLISH_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CI_MODE, MCP_TTS_CUSTOM_INSTRUCTIONS, MCP_TTS_DEVICE_INDEX, MCP_TTS_DEVICE_NAME, MCP_TTS_HOST, MCP_TTS_LOG_LEVEL, MCP_TTS_PORT, MCP_TTS_PROVIDER, MCP_TTS_SPEED, MCP_TTS_VOICE, MCP_TTS_VOICE_PRESET, MCP_TTS_VOLUME, TTS_PROVIDER
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso elevenlabs.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names elevenlabs.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ELEVENLABS_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, UV_PUBLISH_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-tts

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/bump_version.py:104 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "status"], check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/bump_version.py:107 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "add", "pyproject.toml"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.py:121 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Override with environment variables (including from .env)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.py:102 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env file firstFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/bump_version.py:111 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "commit", "-m", commit_msg], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/main.py:166 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files<li><strong>Environment issues:</strong> Verify you have a valid OpenAI API key in your <code>.env</code> file</li>Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈56 tok
1 file · 25 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-tts@0.3.0 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.