mcp-trust@0.1.1
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "A neutral public trust registry for MCP servers — check before you connect." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MCP_TRUST_SCAN_CREDENTIALSConfiguration, not credentials: DB_PATH, MCP_TRUST_DB, MCP_TRUST_ENGINE, MCP_TRUST_RECEIPTS_DIR, MCP_TRUST_SANDBOX, MCP_TRUST_SANDBOX_IMAGE, MCP_TRUST_SANDBOX_NETWORK- Where it talks to
- mcp-trust.example, mcptrust.dev (its own)Also shields.io, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names shields.io, githubusercontent.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCP_TRUST_SCAN_CREDENTIALS only into requests to mcp-trust.example (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"does not rebuild catalog_snapshot.json or static site output",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.``npx -y <pkg>``) so the engine can connect and enumerate its tools. That runsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."../etc/passwd", # path traversalFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(["git", *args], text=True, capture_output=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.own package at launch (``npx -y`` / ``uvx`` pull from a registry). For untrustedFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.``npx <pkg>``), which runs third-party code. Execution is isolated by a pluggableFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-trust@0.1.1 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.