Skills/PyPI/mcp-toolsets-runtime

mcp-toolsets-runtime@0.13.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Shared runtime for MCP Toolsets: discover LangChain tools, serve them as MCP, plus a CLI and an example chat agent." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 723 daysInstalls 3,807Last detonated 4d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-toolsets-runtime -- uvx mcp-toolsets-runtime
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso default.svc, example.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-toolsets-runtime

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_agent/main.py:102 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"environment or .env, and install the provider package "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/mcp_agent/test_host.py:239 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/mcp_agent_api/ui/assets/index--MGU9ENk.css:1 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…ottom:1px solid var(--line)}.thread{flex:none;font-size:12px;white-space:nowrap}.log{flex:1;overflow-y:auto;position:relative;padding:1.25rem;display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:.6rem}.dim{color:var(--dim)}.said{margin:0;max-width:44rem…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp_runtime/local.py:160 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network# lifespan (see MCPServer.streamable_http_app), but mounting it as aFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_agent/main.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesand ``PROVIDER_MODEL`` are read from the environment or a ``.env`` file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentsrc/mcp_agent_api/ui/index.html:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent · informational: not an instruction fileWhat the deployment says about this client. `mcp_agent_api.ui` rewrites the contents of this element when it serves the page; the values below are what `npm runFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_agent/main.py:161 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesmodel_config = SettingsConfigDict(env_file=".env", extra="allow")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentjs/agent-ui/index.html:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent · informational: not an instruction fileWhat the deployment says about this client. `mcp_agent_api.ui` rewrites the contents of this element when it serves the page; the values below are what `npm runFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_agent/main.py:149 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Agent configuration, validated from the environment or a .env file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_toolset/main.py:516 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([uv, "add", name], check=True) # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_agent/main.py:157 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestoolsets (``X_DEMO_TOKEN`` and friends) survive from a ``.env`` intoFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,077 tok
1 file · 80 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-toolsets-runtime@0.13.1 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

mcp-toolsets-runtime@0.13.1 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills