Skills/PyPI/mcp-toolbox-fastmcp

mcp-toolbox-fastmcp@0.0.1.dev0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Maintenance of a set of tools to enhance LLM through MCP protocols." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher fastmcp-me · publishing for 411 daysInstalls 29Last detonated 4d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
BFL_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: LOGURU_LEVEL, MCP_TOOLBOX_LOG_LEVEL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso figma.com, bfl.ml, xiaoyuzhoufm.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names figma.com, bfl.ml, xiaoyuzhoufm.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects BFL_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-toolbox-fastmcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Script disguised as a text file; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Script disguised as a text filellms.txt contains a shell or batch script# MCP-Toolbox Development Guide for LLMs This guide is designed to help you (an LLM) effectively contribute to the mcp-Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_toolbox/file_ops/tools.py:366 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesignore_patterns: Optional. Glob patterns to ignore (default: ['node_modules', 'dist', 'build', 'public', 'static', '.next', '.git', '.vscode', '.idea', '.DS_Store', '.env', '.venv'])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDmcp_toolbox/flux/api.py:9 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwareAPI_URL = "https://api.bfl.ml"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/markitdown/test_markitdown_tools.py:89 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesawait convert_file_to_markdown("input.txt", "output.md")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/markitdown/test_markitdown_tools.py:48 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesresult = await convert_file_to_markdown("input.txt", "output.md")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/command_line/test_command_line_tools.py:17 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesself.kill = MagicMock()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_toolbox/file_ops/tools.py:385 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/markitdown/test_markitdown_tools.py:58 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert "input.txt" in result["input_file"]Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:7 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_toolbox/file_ops/tools.py:352 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/markitdown/test_markitdown_tools.py:68 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesresult = await convert_file_to_markdown("nonexistent.txt", "output.md")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 75 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-toolbox-fastmcp@0.0.1.dev0 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim fastmcp-me: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Script disguised as a text file≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. URL with suspicious TLD≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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