Skills/PyPI/mcp-this

mcp-this@0.0.22

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Server that exposes CLI commands as tools for Claude using YAML configuration files" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher shane-kercheval-shane.kercheval · publishing for 552 daysInstalls 119Last detonated 4d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-this -- uvx mcp-this
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-this

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_this/configs/default.yaml:50 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "-not -path './.env/*'";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_this/configs/default.yaml:205 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files-not -path "*/.env/*"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_this/configs/default.yaml:15 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files-I ".git|.claude|.env|.venv|env|node_modules|__pycache__|.DS_Store|*.pyc"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_this/configs/default.yaml:127 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files--exclude-dir=.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/default_tool_descriptions.md:63 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "-not -path './.env/*'";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_builtin_config_github.py:376 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.name", "Test User"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/default_tool_descriptions.md:141 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…ents>> '<<pattern>>' . --exclude-dir=.git --exclude-dir=.claude --exclude-dir=.env --exclude-dir=.venv --exclude-dir=env --exclude-dir=node_modules --exclude-…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/tests.yaml:41 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/tests.yaml:42 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install -y tree lynxFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_builtin_config_github.py:412 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "commit", "-m", message], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_mcp_server.py:266 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceparams = {"message": "Hello; rm -rf /"}Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_mcp_server.py:266 · Destructive file system command detectedparams = {"message": "Hello; rm -rf /"}Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_builtin_config_github.py:374 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "init"], check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_builtin_config_github.py:408 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "add", filename], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/default_tool_descriptions.md:24 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestree '<<directory>>' -a --gitignore -I ".git|.claude|.env|.venv|env|node_modules|__pycache__|.DS_Store|*.pyc" -I "<<custom_excludes>>" <<format_args>>Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_mcp_server.py:268 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceassert result == "echo Hello; rm -rf /"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/default_tool_descriptions.md:221 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…<<files>> -type f -not -path "*/.git/*" -not -path "*/.claude/*" -not -path "*/.env/*" -not -path "*/.venv/*" -not -path "*/env/*" -not -path "*/node_modules/*" -n…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_builtin_config_github.py:375 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.email", "[email protected]"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageMakefile:101 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y uvx mcp-this --config ./src/mcp_this/configs/default.yaml --verboseFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_mcp_server.py:268 · Destructive file system command detectedassert result == "echo Hello; rm -rf /"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files-include .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈57 tok
1 file · 38 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-this@0.0.22 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.