Skills/PyPI/mcp-test-harness

mcp-test-harness@5.3.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Test Harness -- pytest-style testing framework for MCP servers with automated test discovery, assertions, fixtures, and CI reporting." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher vaquarkhan · publishing for 265 daysInstalls 202Last detonated 4d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso shields.io, githubusercontent.com, pypistats.org, pepy.tech, evil.test, benchmark.test, nist.gov, schemastore.org, owasp.org, google.internal, example.invalid — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-test-harness

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; HTTP URL with a raw public IP address. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_test_harness/incident_conformance.py:27 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{"path": "docs", "follow_symlinks": True, "target": "../.env"},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_test_harness/html_reporter.py:1816 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env-list {{ margin: 0; padding-left: 1.1rem; }} .env-list code {{ font-size: 0.75rem; color: #a8c5e8; word-break: break-all; }}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresssrc/mcp_test_harness/url_policy.py:34 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name"https://240.0.0.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_test_harness/incident_conformance.py:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"file:///etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build_demo_video.py:82 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresssrc/mcp_test_harness/url_policy.py:32 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name"https://224.0.0.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_test_harness/incident_conformance.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_test_harness/incident_conformance.py:26 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"link->/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_test_harness/security_payloads.py:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"../../../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_test_harness/security_payloads.py:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_test_harness/security_payloads.py:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"....//....//etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresssrc/mcp_test_harness/url_policy.py:28 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials"https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build_demo_video.py:97 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_test_harness/incident_conformance.py:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build_binary.py:50 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=str(ROOT))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build_binary.py:62 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/mcp_test_harness/url_policy.py:24 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://user:[email protected]/hook",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_test_harness/security_payloads.py:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"file:///etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcp_test_harness/lifecycle.py:5 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeswith a 10-second force-kill fallback, and background process monitoring.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build_demo_video.py:112 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Dense URL-encoded contentsrc/mcp_test_harness/security_payloads.py:37 · Dense URL-encoded content — may be obfuscating payloads"%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcp_test_harness/lifecycle.py:39 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Force-kill timeout in seconds (Requirement 1.5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcp_test_harness/lifecycle.py:238 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# then force-kill after _FORCE_KILL_TIMEOUT (Req 1.5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcp_test_harness/lifecycle.py:98 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes- Graceful shutdown with 10s force-kill fallback (Req 1.4, 1.5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build_demo_video.py:322 · Python subprocess execution detectedprobe = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresssrc/mcp_test_harness/url_policy.py:34 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering"https://240.0.0.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_test_harness/pdf_export.py:87 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcp_test_harness/lifecycle.py:215 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"""Gracefully shut down the server with a 10s force-kill timeout.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcp_test_harness/resiliency.py:62 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesIt does not kill the server process; use integration tests with processFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresssrc/mcp_test_harness/url_policy.py:32 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering"https://224.0.0.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_test_harness/pdf_export.py:139 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresssrc/mcp_test_harness/url_policy.py:29 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target"https://10.1.2.3/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈73 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-test-harness@5.3.1 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim vaquarkhan: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. HTTP URL with a raw public IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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