Skills/PyPI/mcp-taxii

mcp-taxii@0.1.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "MCP Server that serves as a TAXII Client for AI Agents" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher davydany · publishing for 312 daysInstalls 12Last detonated 5d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
DATABASE_URLMCPTAXII_PASSWORDTAXII_ADMIN_PASSWORDTAXII_API_USER_PASSWORDTAXII_READONLY_USER_PASSWORDTAXII_REQUIRE_AUTH_FOR_DISCOVERYTAXII_TEST_USER_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: MCPTAXII_HOST, MCPTAXII_USERNAME, TAXII_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_READ, TAXII_API_ROOT_20, TAXII_API_ROOT_21, TAXII_SERVER_CONTACT, TAXII_SERVER_DESCRIPTION, TAXII_SERVER_TITLE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandMakefile:88 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes@if [ -f $(TEST_SERVER_PID_FILE) ] && kill -0 $$(cat $(TEST_SERVER_PID_FILE)) 2>/dev/null; then \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_taxii/server.py:201 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Try to load .env file if it existsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_taxii/server.py:205 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = Path.cwd() / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdev/taxii_test_server/run_server.py:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Try .env.example as fallbackFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandMakefile:104 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -9 $$PID 2>/dev/null || true; \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdev/taxii_test_server/show_credentials.py:49 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint("\nOr create a .env file in the server directory with these settings.")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdev/taxii_test_server/run_server.py:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint(f"No .env file found. Using defaults from .env.example")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandMakefile:100 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif kill -0 $$PID 2>/dev/null; then \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandMakefile:102 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill $$PID 2>/dev/null || true; \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdev/taxii_test_server/run_server.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = Path(__file__).parent / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdev/taxii_test_server/run_server.py:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env file if it existsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandMakefile:115 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes@if [ -f $(TEST_SERVER_PID_FILE) ] && kill -0 $$(cat $(TEST_SERVER_PID_FILE)) 2>/dev/null; then \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdev/taxii_test_server/run_server.py:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_example = Path(__file__).parent / ".env.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈48 tok
1 file · 41 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-taxii@0.1.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim davydany: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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