Skills/PyPI/mcp-tasker

mcp-tasker@1.8.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Markdown task tracker with MCP server for humans and AI agents, designed to live in git alongside code" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher greendwin · publishing for 226 daysInstalls 63Last detonated 5d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-tasker

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shell.sandbox/base/Dockerfile:19 · Remote installer piped to shellRUN curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_lts.x | bash - \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/tasker/git.py:43 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detected.sandbox/base/Dockerfile:21 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell pattern.sandbox/base/Dockerfile:27 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeRUN curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shell.sandbox/base/Dockerfile:27 · Remote installer piped to shellRUN curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.sandbox/scripts/_lib.sh:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Sourced by other scripts — loads .env and exports COMPOSE_FILE.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.sandbox/scripts/_lib.sh:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [[ ! -f .env ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/tasker/cli/_helpers.py:33 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([editor, str(path)])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.sandbox/scripts/_lib.sh:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "Error: sandbox/.env not found. Copy .env.example to .env and edit it." >&2Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detected.sandbox/base/Dockerfile:7 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell pattern.sandbox/base/Dockerfile:19 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeRUN curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_lts.x | bash - \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈307 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-tasker@1.8.1 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim greendwin: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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