mcp-task-orchestrator@1.8.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol server for task orchestration" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- nothing has run yet
- What we could not test
- everything: the server has not run yet
Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.
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Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
subprocess.run([str(self.python_exe), "-m", "pip", "install", "-r", "requirements.txt"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run([str(self.python_exe), "-m", "pip", "install", "--upgrade", "pip"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "venv", str(self.venv_path)],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.mock_process.kill = MagicMock()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run([str(self.python_exe), "-m", "pip", "install", "-e", "."],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "-r", "requirements.txt"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install"] + missing_deps,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-task-orchestrator@1.8.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim echoingvesper: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.