mcp-stdio@0.46.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Stdio-to-HTTP gateway — connects MCP clients to remote HTTP MCP servers" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MCP_BEARER_TOKENMCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDMCP_OAUTH_REFRESH_LEEWAYor--oauth-refresh-leeway/--oauth-resource/--bearer-token/--oauth-use-id-token/--oauth-timeout/--oauth/--oauth-device/--oauth-scope/--oauth-eager/--no-oauth-reauthConfiguration, not credentials: BROWSER, DISPLAY, WAYLAND_DISPLAY- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso example.org, claude.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names example.org, claude.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCP_BEARER_TOKEN, MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, MCP_OAUTH_REFRESH_LEEWAY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"""Terminate the backend child, escalating to kill if needed."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("https://user:[email protected]/mcp", "https://api.example.com/mcp"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.NOT chmod the fd or emit the corrupt-store warning — it is a pure probe.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.authorization codes to be POSTed to ``https://user:pass@host/token``.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# the chmod can genuinely fail (a dir owned by anotherFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# operator passed `https://user:pass@host/mcp` against a correct PRMFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.no path-based chmod on a just-created ancestor to be redirected by a symlinkFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.``https://user:pass@host/mcp`` server URL would cause credentials andFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.self._proc = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 — operator-supplied argvFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# ``https://user:pass@host/mcp`` would leak credentials into the OIDC GET andFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.("https://u:p@host:8443/mcp?a=1", "https://host:8443/mcp?a=1"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# defensive re-chmod of the XDG dir. An older version (or permissiveFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Note: a HARD kill (SIGKILL / power loss / OOM) between the tempFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."https://user:[email protected]/client.json", # userinfoFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# (a path-based chmod would FOLLOW a symlink and 0o600 an attacker /Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# thread, which would kill the stream abruptly — aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo mv mcp-publisher /usr/local/bin/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# keep a LIVE child's terminate/kill wait off theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."https://user:[email protected]/mcp", "oauth-authorization-server"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose._authorization_base_url("https://user:[email protected]:8443/mcp")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose._normalize_key("https://userC:[email protected]/mcp")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.then terminate, then kill — all bounded", but the wait AFTER `kill()`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.real_chmod = os.chmodFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."""Rule 6's relay half: EOF, then terminate, then kill — all bounded.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.real_chmod = os.chmodFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.assert redact_url("https://u:pw@[2001:db8::1]/x") == "https://[2001:db8::1]/x"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.terminate step gets the generous bound and the kill is the lastFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."file:///etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Drives `_StubProc` through the full EOF -> terminate -> kill escalationFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 — fixed argv, no shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.redact_url("https://user:[email protected]/mcp") == "https://example.com/mcp"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose._authorization_base_url("https://user:[email protected]/v1/mcp")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.its `finally`; a kill would orphan them, which is why theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.f"legacy dir was not tightened to 0o700; chmod calls: {chmodded!r}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.k1 = _normalize_key("https://userA:[email protected]/mcp")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.defensive re-chmod of the XDG dir."""Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.proc = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 — fixed argv, no shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.full EOF -> terminate -> kill escalation, so all three `wait()` callsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.out = scrub_secrets("ConnectError to https://user:[email protected]/mcp")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.out = scrub_secrets("401 for url https://tok:pw@host:8443/x?a=b")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert server._redirect_key("http://u:[email protected]:5/cb") is NoneFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.out = scrub_secrets("fail: https://u:p@[::1]:9000/relay")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.k2 = _normalize_key("https://userB:[email protected]/mcp")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."https://u:[email protected]/cb", # userinfoFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.altered, so a symlink-swap cannot chmod an attacker-chosen file."""Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.out = redact_url("https://user:[email protected]:9000/x?token=SECRETTOK")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-stdio@0.46.0 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.