Skills/PyPI/mcp-ssh-gateway

mcp-ssh-gateway@7.0.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server that gives an AI agent real SSH terminals: sessions that return the moment a command ends, scrollable output, prompt and question detection, Keenetic router CLI support." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher d00mus · publishing for 47 daysInstalls 456Last detonated 5d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-ssh-gateway

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandmcp_ssh_gateway/files.py:154 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"""The permissions of an existing file, as chmod takes them; None for a new one (umask decides)."""Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_ssh_gateway/main.py:56 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileshelp="Also offer the hosts of ~/.ssh/config (key authentication)")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorytests/test_config.py:27 · References a credential file in the home directoryself.assertEqual(config.key_path, os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_ed25519"))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_ssh_gateway/config.py:73 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesimported: bool = False # came from ~/.ssh/config, not from servers.jsonFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_stdio_process.py:17 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/integration/test_linux_hosts.py:199 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsself.gw.run("echo old > /tmp/keep.sh && chmod 750 /tmp/keep.sh")Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_ssh_gateway/config.py:186 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Register the hosts of ~/.ssh/config that are not configured yet (key authentication)."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/support.py:33 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_config.py:27 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesself.assertEqual(config.key_path, os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_ed25519"))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_files.py:433 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsif match := re.match(r"base64 -d '?(\S+?)'? > '?(\S+?)'? && (?:chmod (\S+) '?\S+'? && )?mv -f '?\S+'? '?(\S+?)'?$", command):Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_logs.py:41 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking("git clone https://user:s3cret@host/repo.git", "git clone https://user:******@host/repo.git"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_ssh_gateway/config.py:203 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdescription=f"from ~/.ssh/config ({name})", imported=True))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandmcp_ssh_gateway/session.py:341 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"signal action=stdin text=exit, then run one command at a time (sudo <command>).")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/support.py:41 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandmcp_ssh_gateway/server.py:324 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexcept Exception as exc: # a bug must not kill the connectionFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/integration/test_gateway_features.py:222 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesself.assertEqual(self.gw.run("cat /tmp/nf.txt")["output"].splitlines()[1:], ["alpha", "gamma"])Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_files.py:539 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesfor name in ("id_ed25519", "servers.json", "putty.ppk", os.path.join(".git", "config")):Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/integration/test_gateway_features.py:79 · Destructive file system command detectedrepository = ("rm -rf /tmp/pager && git init -q /tmp/pager && cd /tmp/pager && "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/integration/images/debian/Dockerfile:6 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionmcp_ssh_gateway/session.py:446 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesrun.log.output(lines)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/integration/images/shells/Dockerfile:7 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandmcp_ssh_gateway/session.py:340 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"(sudo -s, su, bash). The gateway cannot tell where a command ends in it. Leave it with "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_ssh_gateway/config.py:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Server definitions (servers.json, ~/.ssh/config) and runtime settings."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_ssh_gateway/config.py:188 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespath = path or os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/config")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/integration/images/nosftp/Dockerfile:6 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_config.py:24 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconfig = target(host="${GW_HOST}", password="${GW_PASS}", key_path="~/.ssh/${GW_KEY}")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandmcp_ssh_gateway/files.py:186 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod = f"chmod {mode} {temporary} && " if mode else ""Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_terminal.py:54 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([sh, "-c", f"PS1='{ps1}'\n{typed}\n{show_prompt}"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_session.py:308 · Destructive file system command detectedsession.run("rm -rf /", wait=1)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_terminal.py:38 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([sh, "-n", "-c", wrap_posix(command, 1)], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_session.py:308 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicesession.run("rm -rf /", wait=1)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_logs.py:53 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"cat /etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈83 tok
1 file · 62 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-ssh-gateway@7.0.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim d00mus: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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