Skills/PyPI/mcp-servicenex-v2

mcp-servicenex-v2@0.4.4

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for the ServiceNEX REST API: tickets, workflows, knowledge, services, users, and resources" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher ivedha-tech · publishing for 371 daysInstalls 513Last detonated 7 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp-servicenex-v2 -- uvx mcp-servicenex-v2
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SERVICENEX_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: SERVICENEX_API_BASE, SERVICENEX_API_TIMEOUT, TWINE_USERNAME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SERVICENEX_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-servicenex-v2

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.4.1

vet-skills diff mcp-servicenex-v2 0.4.1 0.4.4

This version reaches for something 0.4.1 did not: 1 new credential variable (SERVICENEX_API_KEY). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New credential variables
SERVICENEX_API_KEY

0.4.1 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release.py:63 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(args, cwd=ROOT, env=env, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_servicenex_v2/config.py:29 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# passwd entry (e.g. some containers); skip the user .env in that case.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/release.py:2 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Build and publish mcp-servicenex-v2. Tokens come from repo-root .env."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_servicenex_v2/config.py:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_safe_load_dotenv(PROJECT_ROOT / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/release.py:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = ROOT / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/release.py:99 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesf"Set {expected} in {ROOT / '.env'} "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_servicenex_v2/config.py:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Centralized configuration loaded from environment / .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release.py:69 · Python subprocess execution detectedprobe = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyproject.toml:53 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"/.env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_servicenex_v2/config.py:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn Path.home() / ".config" / "mcp-servicenex-v2" / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/release.py:159 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdescription="Package or publish mcp-servicenex-v2 using tokens from .env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/release.py:100 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"(see .env.example)."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 31 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-servicenex-v2@0.4.4 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.