mcp-servicenex-v2@0.4.4
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for the ServiceNEX REST API: tickets, workflows, knowledge, services, users, and resources" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SERVICENEX_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: SERVICENEX_API_BASE, SERVICENEX_API_TIMEOUT, TWINE_USERNAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SERVICENEX_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.4.1
vet-skills diff mcp-servicenex-v2 0.4.1 0.4.4This version reaches for something 0.4.1 did not: 1 new credential variable (SERVICENEX_API_KEY). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New credential variables
- SERVICENEX_API_KEY
0.4.1 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
subprocess.run(args, cwd=ROOT, env=env, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# passwd entry (e.g. some containers); skip the user .env in that case.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Build and publish mcp-servicenex-v2. Tokens come from repo-root .env."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose._safe_load_dotenv(PROJECT_ROOT / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.env_path = ROOT / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.f"Set {expected} in {ROOT / '.env'} "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Centralized configuration loaded from environment / .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.probe = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."/.env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return Path.home() / ".config" / "mcp-servicenex-v2" / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.description="Package or publish mcp-servicenex-v2 using tokens from .env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."(see .env.example)."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-servicenex-v2@0.4.4 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.