Skills/PyPI/mcp-server-twelve-data

mcp-server-twelve-data@0.2.5

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol server providing tools access Twelve Data." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher twelve-data-pbc. · publishing for 534 daysInstalls 4,036Last detonated 5d ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OPENAI_API_KEY or --twelve-data-apikey / --u-tool-open-ai-api-key / --u-tool-oauth2Configuration, not credentials: DESC_JSON_PATH, LANCE_DB_DOCS_PATH, LANCE_DB_ENDPOINTS_PATH, LANCEDB_PATH, OPENAPI_SPEC
Where it talks to
twelvedata.com (its own)Also mesasoftware.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names mesasoftware.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OPENAI_API_KEY only into requests to twelvedata.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets OPENAI_API_KEY=twelvedata.com -- uvx mcp-server-twelve-data

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/generate_response_models.py:20 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(cmd, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp_server_twelve_data/common.py:9 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcp_server_base_url = "https://mcp.twelvedata.com"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/generate_docs_embeddings.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv('../.env')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/generate_endpoints_embeddings.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv('../.env')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/common.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdotenv_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '..', '.env')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/select_embedding.py:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv('../.env')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/test_mcp_main.py:15 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdotenv_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '..', '.env')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialssrc/mcp_server_twelve_data/__init__.py:24 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering"3. Provide the API key in the 'Authorization' header as: 'apikey <your-apikey>'."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈58 tok
1 file · 44 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-twelve-data@0.2.5 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim twelve-data-pbc.: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim twelve-data-pbc.Propose a patch to the maintainer