Skills/PyPI/mcp-server-ticktick

mcp-server-ticktick@0.4.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for TickTick task management" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher broven · publishing for 275 daysInstalls 93Last detonated 5d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server-ticktick -- uvx mcp-server-ticktick
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Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TICKTICK_ACCESS_TOKENTICKTICK_AUTH_URLTICKTICK_CLIENT_SECRETTICKTICK_REFRESH_TOKENTICKTICK_TOKEN_URL or --client-secretConfiguration, not credentials: TICKTICK_BASE_URL, TICKTICK_CLIENT_ID
Where it talks to
ticktick.com (its own)Also dida365.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names dida365.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TICKTICK_ACCESS_TOKEN, TICKTICK_AUTH_URL, TICKTICK_CLIENT_SECRET, TICKTICK_REFRESH_TOKEN, TICKTICK_TOKEN_URL only into requests to ticktick.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets TICKTICK_ACCESS_TOKEN=ticktick.com,TICKTICK_AUTH_URL=ticktick.com,TICKTICK_CLIENT_SECRET=ticktick.com,TICKTICK_REFRESH_TOKEN=ticktick.com,TICKTICK_TOKEN_URL=ticktick.com -- uvx mcp-server-ticktick

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsticktick_mcp/src/auth.py:469 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesparser.add_argument('--env-file', help='Path to .env file with credentials')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsticktick_mcp/src/server.py:55 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringRun the following command and enter your credentials when prompted:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈56 tok
1 file · 20 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-ticktick@0.4.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.