mcp-server-taxcode@1.2.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Enterprise Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Tax Code" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso house.gov, ecfr.gov, pr.gov, georgia.gov, gofastmcp.com, encode.io, govinfo.gov, irs.gov — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- nothing has run yet
- What we could not test
- everything: the server has not run yet
Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 54/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
env_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.kill -TERM "${SERVER_PID}" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.<summary><b>🧡 Claude Desktop & Claude Code</b></summary> Add to `~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json` (macOS) or `%APPDATA%\Claude\Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."""Write the generated docs (pages, llms.txt, the llms-full files) into ``output_dir``.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.- ``rates/<code>.json``: the rate table the compliance tools compute that state's taxFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.if [[ -n "${SERVER_PID}" ]] && kill -0 "${SERVER_PID}" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.npx --yes "@modelcontextprotocol/conformance@${CONFORMANCE_VERSION}" server \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-taxcode@1.2.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
26 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim christianclaudio: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.