Skills/PyPI/mcp-server-tapd

mcp-server-tapd@8.0.83

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "TAPD MCP Server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher ryanjhzheng-zhengjianhong95 · publishing for 594 daysInstalls 7,883Last detonated 5d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server-tapd -- uvx mcp-server-tapd
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TAPD_ACCESS_TOKENTAPD_API_PASSWORD or --access-token / --api-passwordConfiguration, not credentials: BOT_URL, CURRENT_USER_NICK, MODE, TAPD_API_BASE_URL, TAPD_API_USER, TAPD_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
tapd.cn (its own)Also woa.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names woa.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TAPD_ACCESS_TOKEN, TAPD_API_PASSWORD only into requests to tapd.cn (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets TAPD_ACCESS_TOKEN=tapd.cn,TAPD_API_PASSWORD=tapd.cn -- uvx mcp-server-tapd

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Dense URL-encoded contentsrc/mcp_server_tapd/server.py:413 · Dense URL-encoded content — may be obfuscating payloadsTAPD API 文档:https://open.tapd.cn/document/api-doc/API%E6%96%87%E6%A1%A3/api_reference/story/update_story.htmlFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Dense URL-encoded contentsrc/mcp_server_tapd/server.py:751 · Dense URL-encoded content — may be obfuscating payloadsTAPD API 文档:https://open.tapd.cn/document/api-doc/API%E6%96%87%E6%A1%A3/api_reference/bug/update_bug.htmlFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Dense URL-encoded contentsrc/mcp_server_tapd/server.py:381 · Dense URL-encoded content — may be obfuscating payloadsTAPD API 文档:https://open.tapd.cn/document/api-doc/API%E6%96%87%E6%A1%A3/api_reference/story/get_stories_count.htmlFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_server_tapd/app_config.py:70 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""从 .env 文件获取配置"""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Dense URL-encoded contentsrc/mcp_server_tapd/server.py:722 · Dense URL-encoded content — may be obfuscating payloadsTAPD API 文档:https://open.tapd.cn/document/api-doc/API%E6%96%87%E6%A1%A3/api_reference/bug/get_bugs_count.htmlFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Dense URL-encoded contentsrc/mcp_server_tapd/server.py:802 · Dense URL-encoded content — may be obfuscating payloadsTAPD API 文档:https://open.tapd.cn/document/api-doc/API%E6%96%87%E6%A1%A3/api_reference/bug/add_bug.htmlFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈42 tok
1 file · 15 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-tapd@8.0.83 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

mcp-server-tapd@8.0.83 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills