mcp-server-ssh@2.0.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "SSH MCP server for remote Linux command execution via Model Context Protocol" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SSH_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: SSH_HOST, SSH_KEY_FILE, SSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE, SSH_USER- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SSH_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Destructive file system command detected; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# Case matters here: chmod/chown spell recursive as an uppercase -R, andFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# `rm -rf /` and `rm -rf /*`, but not `rm -rf /var/tmp/build` — that one isFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("rm -rf /", True, True),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.str, Field(description="Process name or search term; a numeric PID for kill and status.")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# keeps `rm -rf /; true` from escaping a rule anchored to the end of the input.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("rm -rf /*", True, True),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("rm -rf /*", True, True),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# `r$()m`, `r${x}m` (x unset) and `r```m` all invoke rm. They are removed beforeFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.signal: Annotated[str, Field(description="Signal to send, for the kill action.")] = "TERM",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.because `chmod -R` is not the same option as `chmod -r`. Each segment of aFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# `rm -rf /` and `rm -rf /*`, but not `rm -rf /var/tmp/build` — that one isFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# `chmod 755 /srv -R` is recursive.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.('bash -c "rm -rf /"', True, True),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# before *and after* the file operands — `rm /tmp/missing -rf /var` deletesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("rm -rf /var/tmp/build", False, True),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("rm -rf /", True, True),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = await ssh.run(f"kill -{quote(signal)} {target}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda", True, False),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("rm -rf /var", True, True),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("rm -rf / && echo ok", True, True),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("rm /tmp/missing -rf /var", True, True),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("chmod 755 file", False, False),Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.("chmod -R 755 /var/www", False, True),Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.assert not any(c.startswith("kill ") for c in host.commands)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."Mon Jan 1 12:00:00 2026 postgres", # what holds the PID by kill timeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("chmod --recursive 755 /srv", False, True),Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.if command.startswith("kill "):Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("chmod -v -R 755 /srv", False, True),Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.("chown -R user:group /srv", False, True),Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-ssh@2.0.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mytsx: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.