Skills/PyPI/mcp-server-sigma

mcp-server-sigma@2.2.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Enterprise Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Sigma Computing — provision dashboards, construct data models, and automate cloud analytics." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher christianclaudio · publishing for 79 daysInstalls 803Last detonated 5d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SIGMA_CLIENT_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: SIGMA_ALLOWED_HOSTS, SIGMA_ALLOWED_TENANTS, SIGMA_API_BASE_URL, SIGMA_CLIENT_ID, SIGMA_MCP_JSON_RESPONSE, SIGMA_MCP_LOG_FORMAT, SIGMA_MCP_PROFILE, SIGMA_MCP_STATELESS_HTTP, SIGMA_MCP_TOOL_SEARCH_BACKEND, SIGMA_STRICT_TENANT_ALLOWLIST
Where it talks to
sigmacomputing.com (its own)Also gofastmcp.com, encode.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names gofastmcp.com, encode.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SIGMA_CLIENT_SECRET only into requests to sigmacomputing.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets SIGMA_CLIENT_SECRET=sigmacomputing.com -- uvx mcp-server-sigma

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:238 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>🐙 GitHub Copilot CLI & Workspace Agent</b></summary> Add `.github/mcp.json` to your repository: ```json { "mcpServers": { "sigma": { "type": "localFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/write_ops_check.py:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessource .env && PYTHONPATH=src python3 scripts/write_ops_check.pyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_safety.py:313 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_unit.py:355 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials"https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_release_notes.py:448 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/check_conformance.sh:63 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx --yes "@modelcontextprotocol/conformance@${CONFORMANCE_VERSION}" server \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_pinned_connect.py:93 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetmonkeypatch.setenv("HTTPS_PROXY", "http://10.0.0.9:3128")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release_notes.py:217 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_http_auth.py:412 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_tool_failures.py:121 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialserr = await _call_error("elements_get_doc_page", {"page_slug": "https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_safety.py:178 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_protocol.py:36 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)AGENTS.md:158 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network…ease commit locally, runs `rm -rf dist && uv build`, and confirms the wheel is `mcp_server_sigma-X.Y.Z-py3-none-any.whl` and `scripts/check_version.py` passes; then discards the clone without pushing. - Only the maintainer's go creates t…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check_tool_contract.py:133 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:21 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* && \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/check_conformance.sh:20 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -TERM "${SERVER_PID}" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)scripts/check_conformance.sh:32 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkecho "[*] Starting mcp-server-sigma server on ${HOST}:${PORT} (streamable-http)..."Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/check_conformance.sh:18 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif [[ -n "${SERVER_PID}" ]] && kill -0 "${SERVER_PID}" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_dockerfile.py:131 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - the command is the repo's own Dockerfile RUN lineFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_safety.py:255 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:71 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* && \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_release_notes.py:31 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_safety.py:275 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/sigma_mcp/config.py:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_pinned_connect.py:94 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetmonkeypatch.setenv("ALL_PROXY", "http://10.0.0.9:3128")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈8,602 tok
2 files · 80 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-sigma@2.2.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim christianclaudio: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim christianclaudioPropose a patch to the maintainer