Skills/PyPI/mcp-server-shield

mcp-server-shield@0.1.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Author-side hardening primitives for Python MCP servers." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher trihedron1240 · publishing for 203 daysInstalls 9Last detonated 5d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 67/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

LOW
Prompt injection attemptREADME.md:37 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction filedeny_substrings=["ignore previous instructions"],Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_server_shield/commands.py:172 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_urls.py:28 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingguard.validate_value("https://user:[email protected]/", field="url")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
LOW
Prompt injection attemptREADME.md:93 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction filedeny_substrings: ["ignore previous instructions"]Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈53 tok
1 file · 45 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-shield@0.1.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

13 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim trihedron1240: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. URL with embedded credentials≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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