Skills/PyPI/mcp-server-servicenow

mcp-server-servicenow@0.9.3

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "ServiceNow MCP server for Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Codex and any MCP client: Table API, CMDB, schema, aggregates and update sets, plus four Agent Skills. Read-only mode, OAuth client credentials for headless use, audit log." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher jschuller · publishing for 261 daysInstalls 1,362Last detonated 5d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SERVICENOW_AUTH_TYPESERVICENOW_PASSWORD or --client-secret / --mcp-oauth-client-id / --mcp-oauth-client-secret / --mcp-static-tokensConfiguration, not credentials: GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITHUB_REPOSITORY, GITHUB_RUN_ID, GITHUB_SERVER_URL, GITHUB_SHA, SERVICENOW_INSTANCE_URL, SERVICENOW_USERNAME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso service-now.com, run.app, servicenow.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names service-now.com, run.app, servicenow.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SERVICENOW_AUTH_TYPE, SERVICENOW_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-server-servicenow

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Credential pass-through configuration; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/servicenow_mcp/skill_lint.py:1320 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesf"mcpServers.{name}.env.{key} sets a host or default: use ${{{key}}}, "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/servicenow_mcp/utils/http.py:130 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsproxy tokens.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/servicenow_mcp/eval_kit.py:235 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:1 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentmcp-server: servicenow | tools: 20 | resources: 5 | skills: 4 | transport: stdio,streamable-http | auth: basic,oauth,api_key | framework: fastmcp-4.1Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)Dockerfile:13 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkCMD ["mcp-server-servicenow", "--transport", "streamable-http", "--port", "8080"]Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/servicenow_mcp/skill_lint.py:1292 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesf"mcpServers.{name}.env.{key} is not a setting of this server "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/servicenow_mcp/skill_lint.py:1263 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkf"mcpServers.{name} passes {key} to {args[0]}, which stops at "Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/servicenow_mcp/skill_lint.py:1311 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesf"mcpServers.{name}.env.{key} references "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/servicenow_mcp/cli.py:613 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# parse_args() takes its defaults from the environment the .env set.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/servicenow_mcp/skill_lint.py:1253 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkf"mcpServers.{name} passes {key} {value!r}: use "Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/servicenow_mcp/skill_lint.py:1272 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkf"mcpServers.{name} passes {flag!r}: only {allowed} "Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/servicenow_mcp/skill_lint.py:1280 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkf"mcpServers.{name} passes --allow-js-queries, which lifts the javascript: guard",Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/servicenow_mcp/cli.py:608 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# A .env is loaded only to start the server or run --check: --help andFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/servicenow_mcp/skill_lint.py:1284 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreport.add("error", where, None, f"mcpServers.{name}.env must be an object")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/servicenow_mcp/skill_lint.py:1298 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"error", where, None, f"mcpServers.{name}.env.{key} must be a string"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈13,191 tok
4 files · 56 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-servicenow@0.9.3 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jschuller: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  6. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
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