Skills/PyPI/mcp-server-public-transport

mcp-server-public-transport@0.3.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "An MCP-compatible server for querying public transport data in Europe (UK, CH, BE, NO, Berlin/Brandenburg, PT)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mirodn · publishing for 474 daysInstalls 158Last detonated 5d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server-public-transport -- uvx mcp-server-public-transport
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
UK_TRANSPORT_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_STATELESS, MCP_TRANSPORT, UK_TRANSPORT_APP_ID
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso transitous.org, opendata.ch, transportapi.com, irail.be, transport.rest, entur.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names transitous.org, opendata.ch, transportapi.com, irail.be, transport.rest, entur.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects UK_TRANSPORT_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-server-public-transport

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsconfig.py:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

No other findings across 4,421 lines in 32 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈72 tok
1 file · 32 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-public-transport@0.3.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.