mcp-server-privatedns@0.1.1
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "MCP Server for Tencent Cloud PrivateDNS" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_IDTENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: TENCENTCLOUD_REGION- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- nothing has run yet
- What we could not test
- everything: the server has not run yet
Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…$/src/mcp_server_dnspod/capi_client.py" value="""" 腾讯云客户端创建模块 """ import os from tencentcloud.common import credential from tencentcloud.c…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.… <map> <entry key="file://$PROJECT_DIR$/src/mcp_server_dnspod/capi_client.py" value="""" 腾讯云客户端创建模块 """ import os from tencentcloud.common import credential from tencentcloud.common.profile…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-privatedns@0.1.1 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pypi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Excessive HTML entities detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.