Skills/PyPI/mcp-server-polarion

mcp-server-polarion@2.1.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Polarion ALM — read and write documents and work items" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher devemberx · publishing for 226 daysInstalls 458Last detonated 5d ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-server-polarion

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_server_polarion/core/config.py:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp_server_polarion/tools/_shared/guard/test_runs.py:23 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom mcp_server_polarion.tools._shared.guard._http import (Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp_server_polarion/tools/_shared/guard/_attachment_refs.py:15 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom mcp_server_polarion.tools._shared.guard._http import guarded_pagesFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:240 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>Claude Desktop</b></summary> Add to `claude_desktop_config.json`: ```json { "mcpServers": { "mcp-server-polarion": { "command": "uvx", "args": ["mcpFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:262 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>Cursor</b></summary> Add to Cursor MCP settings: ```json { "mcpServers": { "mcp-server-polarion": { "command": "uvx", "args": ["mcp-server-polarion"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/mcp_server_polarion/core/test_client.py:555 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Cap leak two ways: shell export (delenv) + repo-root .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcp_server_polarion/utils/html.py:389 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesattrs (kill ``on*`` → stored XSS); ``href`` outside ``_SAFE_URL_SCHEMES``Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:217 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>VS Code (GitHub Copilot)</b></summary> Add to `.vscode/mcp.json`: ```json { "servers": { "mcp-server-polarion": { "type": "stdio", "command": "uvx",Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/mcp_server_polarion/core/test_client.py:1207 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkwith patch("mcp_server_polarion.core.client.httpx.AsyncClient") as spy:Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:145 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>Creating & editing</b></summary> > "Create a task in project MCPT titled 'Refactor authentication module' and link it to MCPT-042 as 'relates_to'." Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp_server_polarion/tools/_shared/guard/work_items.py:28 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom mcp_server_polarion.tools._shared.guard._http import (Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_server_polarion/core/config.py:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Shared .env may hold unrelated secrets (eval OPENAI_API_KEY); ignore extras.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp_server_polarion/tools/_shared/guard/_targets.py:15 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom mcp_server_polarion.tools._shared.guard._http import (Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp_server_polarion/tools/_shared/guard/enums.py:19 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom mcp_server_polarion.tools._shared.guard._http import (Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/mcp_server_polarion/core/test_client.py:1197 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkwith patch("mcp_server_polarion.core.client.httpx.AsyncClient") as spy:Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp_server_polarion/tools/_shared/guard/links.py:15 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom mcp_server_polarion.tools._shared.guard._http import paged_responsesFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp_server_polarion/tools/_shared/guard/documents.py:23 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom mcp_server_polarion.tools._shared.guard._http import guarded_pagesFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:284 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>Claude Code</b></summary> Register via the `claude mcp add` command: ```bash claude mcp add mcp-server-polarion \ -e POLARION_URL=https://polarion.eFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈57 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-polarion@2.1.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim devemberx: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim devemberxPropose a patch to the maintainer