Skills/PyPI/mcp-server-motherduck

mcp-server-motherduck@1.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "A MCP server for MotherDuck and local DuckDB" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher tdoehmen-till · publishing for 718 daysInstalls 18,759Last detonated 5d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server-motherduck -- uvx mcp-server-motherduck
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_IDAWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEYAWS_SESSION_TOKENMOTHERDUCK_TOKEN or --motherduck-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: AWS_DEFAULT_REGION, AWS_ENDPOINT
Where it talks to
motherduck.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, AWS_SESSION_TOKEN, MOTHERDUCK_TOKEN and talks to motherduck.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=motherduck.com,AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=motherduck.com,AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=motherduck.com,MOTHERDUCK_TOKEN=motherduck.com -- uvx mcp-server-motherduck

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification command.github/workflows/publish-mcp.yml:86 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x mcp-publisherFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/e2e/fixtures/create_test_db.py:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/e2e/test_http_transport.py:82 · Python subprocess execution detectedself.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/e2e/conftest.py:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)manifest.json:19 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"icon": "src/mcp_server_motherduck/assets/duck_feet_square.png",Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/e2e/test_http_transport.py:557 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.github/workflows/publish-mcp.yml:58 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileselif grep -q "already exists" publish_output.txt || grep -q "File already exists" publish_output.txt; thenFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/e2e/test_protocol_discover.py:19 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈52 tok
1 file · 45 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-motherduck@1.1.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.