Skills/PyPI/mcp-server-monitor

mcp-server-monitor@0.1.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "1-获取远程服务器内存信息；2-执行远程服务器检查；3-获取系统负载；4-显示系统资源使用率；5-监查当前服务的运行状态；6-获取操作系统详细信息；7-检查SSH登录风险；8-检查防火墙配置；9-执行漏洞安全性扫描；10-备份重要系统配置文件；11-检查网络；12-分析服务器日志文件中的错误和警告；13-列出Docker容器及其信息；14-列出Docker镜像；15-列出Docker卷；16-获取指定容器的日志；17-监控容器的资源使用情况；18-检查Docker服务的健康状态和基本信息；19-列出可用工具" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 723 daysInstalls 17Last detonated 5d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server-monitor -- uvx mcp-server-monitor
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-server-monitor

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_server_monitor/tools/utils.py:81 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{"name": "files_to_backup", "type": "list[str]", "default": ["/etc/passwd", "/etc/shadow", "/etc/ssh/sshd_config"]},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_server_monitor/tools/security_tools.py:255 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfiles_to_backup: list[str] = ["/etc/passwd", "/etc/shadow", "/etc/ssh/sshd_config"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_server_monitor/server.py:184 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfiles_to_backup=arguments.get("files_to_backup", ["/etc/passwd", "/etc/shadow", "/etc/ssh/sshd_config"]),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈103 tok
1 file · 28 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-monitor@0.1.1 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.