Skills/PyPI/mcp-server-microsoft-tasks

mcp-server-microsoft-tasks@0.7.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Microsoft Tasks (Planner + To Do, unified) — read-only by default, writes opt-in, never modifies tasks the agent didn't create." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher xmv-solutions-gmbh · publishing for 191 daysInstalls 55Last detonated 5d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server-microsoft-tasks -- uvx mcp-server-microsoft-tasks
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TOKEN_PATHConfiguration, not credentials: DISPLAY, TASKS_TENANT_ID, WAYLAND_DISPLAY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso microsoft.com, astral.sh, office.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names microsoft.com, astral.sh, office.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TOKEN_PATH only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-server-microsoft-tasks

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification command.github/workflows/ci.yml:125 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 ~/.cache/mcp-server-microsoft-tasks/harness-personal/token.jsonFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.github/workflows/ci.yml:112 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 ~/.cache/mcp-server-microsoft-tasks/harness/token.jsonFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,333 tok
4 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-microsoft-tasks@0.7.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.