mcp-server-fetch@2026.11.4
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- nothing has run yet
- What we could not test
- everything: the server has not run yet
Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
<summary>Using Docker</summary> ```json { "mcp": { "servers": { "fetch": { "command": "docker", "args": ["run", "-i", "--rm", "mcp/fetch"] } } } } ```Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.<summary>Using docker</summary> ```json { "mcpServers": { "fetch": { "command": "docker", "args": ["run", "-i", "--rm", "mcp/fetch"] } } } ```Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.# child of its own, which the timeout must kill as well.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.metadata = "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.BOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.# timeout can kill the processes it starts as well.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Whatever the tree kill did, the direct child is certainly gone after this.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.Popen(["true"], start_new_session=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.metadata_robots = "http://169.254.169.254/robots.txt"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.metadata = "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.internal = "http://10.0.0.1/status"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.# group kill and keeps stdout and stderr open; the run must still end.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert text_of(unlisted) == TOOL_ERROR + refused("http://10.0.0.2/", "10.0.0.2")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.unlisted = await session.call_tool("fetch", {"url": "http://10.0.0.2/"})Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim modelcontextprotocol: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +2 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.