mcp-server-browser-use@0.1.9
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for browser-use" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
IBM_API_KEYMISTRAL_API_KEYMOONSHOT_API_KEYSiliconFLOW_API_KEYSKIP_LLM_API_KEY_VERIFICATIONConfiguration, not credentials: ALIBABA_ENDPOINT, AZURE_OPENAI_API_VERSION, AZURE_OPENAI_ENDPOINT, CHROME_PATH, CHROME_USER_DATA, DEEPSEEK_ENDPOINT, IBM_ENDPOINT, IBM_PROJECT_ID, MCP_RESEARCH_TOOL_SAVE_DIR, MCP_SERVER_LOGGING_LEVEL, MISTRAL_ENDPOINT, MOONSHOT_ENDPOINT, OLLAMA_ENDPOINT, OPENAI_ENDPOINT, SiliconFLOW_ENDPOINT, UNBOUND_ENDPOINT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso mistral.ai, aliyuncs.com, ibm.com, getunbound.ai, openrouter.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names mistral.ai, aliyuncs.com, ibm.com, getunbound.ai, openrouter.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects IBM_API_KEY, MISTRAL_API_KEY, MOONSHOT_API_KEY, SiliconFLOW_API_KEY, SKIP_LLM_API_KEY_VERIFICATION only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
base_url = os.getenv("IBM_ENDPOINT", "https://us-south.ml.cloud.ibm.com")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.# always kill all children processes, otherwise chrome leaves a bunch of zombie processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Reload settings after .env might have been loaded and to apply overridesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.None, "--env-file", "-e", help="Path to .env file to load.", exists=True, dir_okay=False, resolve_path=TrueFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.You can use an .env file for convenience.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp_server_browser_use@0.1.9 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.