Skills/PyPI/mcp-server-bedrock-image

mcp-server-bedrock-image@0.1.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "MCP Server for Stability AI image generation on AWS Bedrock" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher yaksh36 · publishing for 273 daysInstalls 18Last detonated 5d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCKBEDROCK_AUTH_MODEConfiguration, not credentials: AWS_REGION, BEDROCK_ENDPOINT, IMAGE_STORAGE_DIRECTORY, SAVE_METADATA
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso amazon.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_server_bedrock_image/bedrock_client.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- "boto3": Standard AWS credentials chain (env vars, ~/.aws, IAM roles, STS).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:65 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><strong>Claude Code</strong></summary> Add to `.claude/settings.json`: ```json { "mcpServers": { "bedrock-image": { "command": "uvx", "args": ["mcp-serFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈57 tok
1 file · 27 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-bedrock-image@0.1.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim yaksh36: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim yaksh36Propose a patch to the maintainer