mcp-server-attom@0.0.12
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for the ATTOM Real Estate API" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ATTOM_API_KEYGITHUB_TOKENPYPI_TOKENTWINE_PASSWORDUV_PUBLISH_TOKENor--gh-token/--pypi-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: ATTOM_DLP_V2_PREFIX, ATTOM_DLP_V3_PREFIX, ATTOM_HOST_URL, ATTOM_PROP_API_PREFIX, LOG_FORMAT, TWINE_USERNAME- Where it talks to
- attomdata.com (its own)
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ATTOM_API_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN, PYPI_TOKEN, TWINE_PASSWORD, UV_PUBLISH_TOKEN and talks to attomdata.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; Access to sensitive file paths; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.prettier-ignoreFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.prettier-ignoreFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.prettier-ignoreFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=capture_output, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.prettier-ignore-endFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.TODO(zanieb): Once we have a `python` shim, note you can execute it with `python` hereFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-attom@0.0.12 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim nkbud: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.