mcp-serve@0.0.19
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Agentic server to support MCP tools for science" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MCP_HUB_SECRETMCPSERVER_JOIN_SECRETMCPSERVER_TOKENRESOURCE_SECRETARY_API_BASERESOURCE_SECRETARY_LLMRESOURCE_SECRETARY_MODELor--hub-secret/--join-secretConfiguration, not credentials: MCPSERVER_HOST, MCPSERVER_PATH, MCPSERVER_PORT, MESSAGELEVEL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso built.careers, flux-framework.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names built.careers, flux-framework.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCP_HUB_SECRET, MCPSERVER_JOIN_SECRET, MCPSERVER_TOKEN, RESOURCE_SECRETARY_API_BASE, RESOURCE_SECRETARY_LLM, RESOURCE_SECRETARY_MODEL only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
output = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, stdout=stdout, env=os.environ.copy())Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.No other findings across 6,159 lines in 68 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-serve@0.0.19 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.