mcp-sentinel@0.1.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Automated testing framework for MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL to the cloud instance metadata address; URL to the cloud instance metadata address; document.cookie access. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
InjectionPayload("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", "ssrf_aws_metadata", "ssrf"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.("http://169.254.169.254/", "ssrf_metadata", "semantic_url"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.InjectionPayload("javascript:alert(document.cookie)", "xss_js_protocol", "xss"),Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.("../../../etc/shadow", "path_traversal_shadow", "semantic_path"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.InjectionPayload("$(cat /etc/passwd)", "cmd_subshell", "command_injection"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert _is_default_invocation(["npx my-mcp-server"]) is TrueFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.InjectionPayload("....//....//....//etc/passwd", "path_traversal_double", "path_traversal"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.InjectionPayload("${IFS}cat${IFS}/etc/passwd", "cmd_ifs_bypass", "command_injection"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.InjectionPayload("../../../etc/passwd", "path_traversal_etc", "path_traversal"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd", "path_traversal_encoded", "path_traversal"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.InjectionPayload("file:///etc/passwd", "ssrf_file_proto", "ssrf"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.("file:///etc/passwd", "path_file_proto", "semantic_path"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-sentinel@0.1.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dev07-harsh: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- document.cookie access≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Dense URL-encoded content≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.