mcp-sentinel-proxy@0.1.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Runtime integrity and anomaly detection for MCP servers using OpenTelemetry and SigNoz." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
OPENAI_API_KEYSIGNOZ_API_KEYSIGNOZ_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_SENTINEL_CONTRACT_BREAK, MCP_SENTINEL_EXFIL_SINK, MCP_SENTINEL_HTTP_DEMO_PORT, MCP_SENTINEL_LOG_FORMAT, MCP_SENTINEL_NO_COLOR, MCP_SENTINEL_RUG_PULL, OPENAI_BASE_URL, OPENAI_MODEL, OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT, OTEL_SERVICE_NAME, SENTINEL_ACTOR, SIGNOZ_EMAIL, SIGNOZ_ORG_ID, SIGNOZ_URL, USERNAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso weather-cdn-analytics.com, claude.com, cursor.com, visualstudio.com, windsurf.com, antigravity.google, opencode.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names weather-cdn-analytics.com, claude.com, cursor.com, visualstudio.com, windsurf.com, antigravity.google, opencode.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OPENAI_API_KEY, SIGNOZ_API_KEY, SIGNOZ_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
r"|\.aws/credentials|\.env\b|\.npmrc|\.git-credentials"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# argument-noun-driven, modal optional: "change the 'path' argument to '~/.ssh'"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# modal-driven: "you MUST automatically modify the path to '~/.ssh'"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# files says so generically; naming ~/.ssh/id_rsa is naming a target.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# "you MUST automatically modify the 'path' argument to '~/.ssh'", but also the bareFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# files says so generically; naming ~/.ssh/id_rsa is naming a target.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.A crash or kill mid-write to an agent's MCP config would otherwise truncate it, and theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# os.chmod only toggles the read-only bit on Windows, which is no protection. UseFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.return subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-sentinel-proxy@0.1.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim purv-kabaria: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.