mcp-security-auditor@1.0.2
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Security evaluation tool for MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers - detect vulnerabilities, enforce read-only mode, and generate compliance reports" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
API_KEYAWS_ACCESS_KEY_IDAWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEYDATABASE_URLPRIVATE_KEY_PATHSECRET_NAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso mitre.org, owasp.org, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names mitre.org, owasp.org, githubusercontent.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_KEY, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, DATABASE_URL, PRIVATE_KEY_PATH, SECRET_NAME only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"""Analyze .env files for security issues."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.(r"process\.env", "system.env", "Environment access"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.(r"/etc/passwd|/etc/shadow", "System file access"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.(r"process\.env", "system.env", "Environment access"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.description="OS command execution via os.system()",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if env_file.name == ".env.example" or env_file.name == ".env.template":Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.for env_file in path.glob(".env*"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Or use a .env file (add to .gitignore):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.code_example="# Instead of subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True)\nsubprocess.run(['command', 'arg1', 'arg2'], shell=False)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-security-auditor@1.0.2 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mcp-security-auditor: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.