Skills/PyPI/mcp-secret-validator

mcp-secret-validator@0.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "LLM-based dynamic secret detection and validation engine" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 723 daysInstalls 41Last detonated 6d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-secret-validator -- uvx mcp-secret-validator
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GEMINI_API_KEY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso invalid.local, amazonaws.com, huggingface.co, stripe.com, slack.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names invalid.local, amazonaws.com, huggingface.co, stripe.com, slack.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GEMINI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-secret-validator

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_server/repo_scanner.py:88 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Stripe-like API key pattern detectedtests/test_advanced_secret_detection.py:19 · Stripe-like API key pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested keyassert "sk_test_123456789abcdef" in findingsFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_server/advanced_secret_detection.py:200 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesre.compile(r"process\.env\.([A-Za-z0-9_]+)"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Stripe-like API key pattern detectedtests/test_advanced_secret_detection.py:25 · Stripe-like API key pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested keyassert "sk_test_123456789abcdef" in findingsFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈54 tok
1 file · 23 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-secret-validator@0.1.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.