mcp-scribe@0.2.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Transcribe any OpenAPI schema into a production-grade MCP server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
API_KEYBEARER_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: OPENAPI_MCP_LOG_FORMAT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso no-color.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names no-color.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_KEY, BEARER_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
".env\n.git\n__pycache__/\n*.pyc\n", encoding="utf-8"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Unquoted values end at an inline comment, matching common .env behaviour.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.RUN useradd --create-home --uid 10001 mcp && chown -R mcp:mcp /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.docker run --rm -i --env-file .env {server_name}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.env_file = candidate / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."and never pass credentials as tool arguments."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose._ENV_EXAMPLE = """# Copy to .env and fill in. Never commit real credentials.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.help="Load credentials from a .env file (keeps secrets out of client configs)",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Look for a ``.env`` beside the current directory. Never searches upward past $HOME."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.(output / ".env.example").write_text(Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Minimal ``.env`` support.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-scribe@0.2.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kyegomez: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.