Skills/PyPI/mcp-reverse-proxy-client

mcp-reverse-proxy-client@0.1.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Outbound-only reverse proxy that tunnels local MCP stdio servers to an MCP gateway (Context Forge)" Observed in sandbox: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher akospapp · publishing for 59 daysInstalls 133Last detonated 6d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso astral.sh, nodejs.org, gofastmcp.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · reached only astral.sh
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-reverse-proxy-client

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.2snetworkCONNECT tcp://astral.sh:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.2sprocessexited 22: curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 403
0.3sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.3sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.5snetworkCONNECT tcp://astral.sh:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.5sprocessexited 22: curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 403

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellinstall.sh:5 · Remote installer piped to shell# curl -fsSL https://<static-url>/install.sh | sh -s -- --gateway-url ... --token ...Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_reverse_proxy_client/config.py:101 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesraise ConfigError(f"mcpServers.{name}.env in {config_path} must be an object")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:8 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# native per-user installs with no sudo and no system package stateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall.sh:5 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# curl -fsSL https://<static-url>/install.sh | sh -s -- --gateway-url ... --token ...Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageinstall.sh:108 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code# from nodejs.org into a cache dir and extract it, giving us a bundled npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageinstall.sh:138 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codelog "npx and uvx already on PATH, nothing to bootstrap"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageinstall.sh:7 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code# Ensures npx and uvx are available (via nix, if present, otherwise viaFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageinstall.sh:133 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codehas_cmd npx || die "Node.js was fetched but 'npx' is still not on PATH"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageinstall.sh:137 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeif has_cmd npx && has_cmd uvx; thenFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcp_reverse_proxy_client/proxy.py:92 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexcept Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001 - one tunnel's errors must not kill othersFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈67 tok
1 file · 17 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-reverse-proxy-client@0.1.0 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim akospapp: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
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