Skills/PyPI/mcp-proxy-oauth-dcr

mcp-proxy-oauth-dcr@0.1.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Proxy with OAuth Dynamic Client Registration support" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mcpproxy · publishing for 281 daysInstalls 27Last detonated 6d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-proxy-oauth-dcr -- uvx mcp-proxy-oauth-dcr
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OAUTH_PROVIDER_URL or --oauth-provider-urlConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_CLIENT_NAME, MCP_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT, MCP_LOG_LEVEL, MCP_MAX_BACKOFF_SECONDS, MCP_RETRY_ATTEMPTS, MCP_SCOPES, MCP_SERVER_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for OAUTH_PROVIDER_URL and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-proxy-oauth-dcr

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.3sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.3sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp_proxy/config/manager.py:184 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcp_server_url="https://example.com/mcp",Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp_proxy/models.py:224 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcp_server_url: HttpUrl = Field(..., description="HTTP MCP server URL")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈54 tok
1 file · 40 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-proxy-oauth-dcr@0.1.1 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

mcp-proxy-oauth-dcr@0.1.1 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills