mcp-probe@0.2.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server security scanner — find plaintext secrets, injection vulnerabilities, and missing auth in your MCP configurations" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"title": "os.popen() call",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."os.popen() executes a command through the shell. If the command "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."title": "os.system() call",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."Replace os.system() with subprocess.run() using a list of arguments "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."os.system() passes commands through the shell, enabling injection. "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.'# os.system("dangerous")\n'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r"~/.gnupg",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.' subprocess.run(f"echo {cmd}", shell=True)\n'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.location=f"{server.source_file}:{server.name}.env.{key}",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.location=f"{server.source_file}:{server.name}.env.{key}",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."Replace os.system() with subprocess.run() using a list of arguments "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."subprocess.run(f'cmd {arg1} {arg2}', shell=True)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r"~/.ssh",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.r"~/.aws",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."Example: subprocess.run(['cmd', arg1, arg2]) instead of "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r"/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.' subprocess.run(args["cmd"], shell=True)\n'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."Replace with subprocess.run() using shell=False and capture output "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.' os.system(f"ls {cmd}")\n'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.location=f"{server.source_file}:{server.name}.env.{key}",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."Example: subprocess.run(['git', 'clone', url]) not "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.' os.system(cmd)\n'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.'output = os.popen("ls -la").read()\n'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r"/etc/shadow",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.' subprocess.run(["echo", args["msg"]])\n'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# The sudo server should be graded FFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# npx unpinned should be flaggedFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.env={"GITHUB_TOKEN": "ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghij"},Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.'# subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True)\n'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.env={"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"},Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-probe@0.2.0 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim satish-patil: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.