mcp-postgres-duwenji@1.2.54
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for PostgreSQL database operations" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MCP_DOCKER_PASSWORDPOSTGRES_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_DOCKER_AUTO_SETUP, MCP_DOCKER_CONTAINER_NAME, MCP_DOCKER_DATA_VOLUME, MCP_DOCKER_DATABASE, MCP_DOCKER_IMAGE, MCP_DOCKER_MAX_WAIT_TIME, MCP_DOCKER_PORT, MCP_DOCKER_USERNAME, MCP_ENABLE_AUTO_EXPLAIN, MCP_LOG_DIR, MCP_LOG_LEVEL, MCP_PROTOCOL_DEBUG, MCP_SLOW_QUERY_THRESHOLD_MS, POSTGRES_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, POSTGRES_DB, POSTGRES_HOST, POSTGRES_MAX_OVERFLOW, POSTGRES_POOL_SIZE, POSTGRES_PORT, POSTGRES_SSL_MODE, POSTGRES_USER- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MCP_DOCKER_PASSWORD, POSTGRES_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# Load .env file if it existsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."chmod 600 /var/lib/postgresql/data/postgresql.conf",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."chown postgres:postgres /var/lib/postgresql/data/postgresql.conf",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-postgres-duwenji@1.2.54 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.